On November 5, 2024, the race for the White House took an unexpected turn, defying the expectations of many politicians, pollsters, and voters. As Americans gathered around their screens waiting for the results to come in, many supporters of former Vice President Kamala Harris had high hopes, but those quickly began to fade as the Electoral College map began to fill in. Still, voters were optimistic. Pundits largely agreed that this election hinged on seven key swing states: Arizona, Nevada, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Georgia. The polling in these states all tended to show a close contest leading to the likelihood of a clean sweep of these states being closely aligned among odds makers. 

Once the dust had settled, Harris lost every swing state, including five states that President Biden won in 2020 that Trump won in 2016 (AZ, WI, MI, PA, and GA), as well as Nevada, which had not voted for a Republican Presidential candidate since 2004. At Trendency, we have followed voter groups from several of the swing states going back as far as 2017: Arizona, Michigan, and Nevada. The historical data we have collected from these voters over the past 4-5 years gives us some insight into why voters in these states voted the way they did last November.

In our previous look-backs (you can find them all here), we were looking at national numbers. In this installment the focus is on the states. As a reminder, Trendency does not ask questions in a binary fashion (e.g., “Are you voting for Harris or Trump?”). Instead, we ask panelists to allocate points to each candidate, indicating the chance they would vote for one or the other. This allows panelists to give more nuance in their responses, allowing us to understand how opinions are shifting, not just on either candidate, but on each candidate themselves. Unlike other polls, this method gives us an insight into voter confidence, which can help us estimate future behavior.

Arizona

From the middle of March 2024, support for Biden in Arizona as the Democratic presidential nominee was relatively volatile, rising and falling on a weekly basis between an average support of 38 and 43%. Trump, although also on fairly unsteady ground, was able to increase his average support level from the upper 30s in March, to 46% in the early stages of the summer. 

After the first presidential debate in late June, both candidates saw a decrease in support, although the drop in support for Biden was greater overall. 

Almost exactly one month later, Biden decided to drop out of the race and support his VP, pushing Harris’ numbers to skyrocket past Biden’s previous high water mark. Interestingly, Trump’s support in the Grand Canyon State also rose in response to this change on the Democratic ticket. 

Right before the election, we showed an average support for Harris of 48% and Trump at 47% (Figure 1). Harris ended up receiving the support of 47% of Arizona voters, while Trump won 52%. 

Isolating 2020 voters in our Arizona panel (these are voters who have been providing data to us over the past four years and do not include voters who have joined our panel since then and report that they voted in 2020), Trump always enjoyed a strong lead among this cohort (Figure 2). Overall support for Biden slowly decreased from mid-March until he dropped out in late July. While Harris’ support quickly passed where Biden had been, it never rose to match the level of support 2020 voters had for Trump, whose support never dropped below the 50% threshold. 

When dealing with averages in partisan politics, the overall results often mask what is truly occurring in the data. An average of 50 doesn’t mean everyone is equally allocating between each option and are completely undecided; rather, most feel strongly in favor of one candidate and are strongly opposed to supporting the other. As seen in Figure 3, nearly half of voters (46%) allocated 80% or higher on their likelihood of supporting Harris’ candidacy, while a similar percentage (49%) stated there was less than a 20% chance they would support her. In comparison to Biden’s distribution of support prior to dropping out of the race, 52% of voters strongly opposed supporting him, while only 2 out of 5 voters (40%) stated there was an 80% or higher chance they would support him at the polls. Following his decision to drop out, the percentage of voters who strongly supported the Democratic presidential nominee increased by 6%.

Trump’s percentage of Arizona voters who strongly supported his candidacy mirrored Harris’ (46%), but he had a higher percentage of voters who said they were highly unlikely to vote for him (52% compared to her 49%) (Figure 4). This was an improvement from his numbers matched up against Biden as the Democratic candidate (+4%), although the percentage of strong opponents also increased slightly (+2%).

The results make a few things clear. Arizona voters viewed Harris as an improvement over Biden, with stronger support for Harris and fewer voters unlikely to back her. Conversely, the percentage of voters unlikely to support Trump grew after Harris entered the race. Both candidates saw higher levels of opposition than strong support, suggesting voters were more motivated to vote against a candidate than for one.

When Biden dropped out, Harris saw a slight improvement in her strong support numbers, but her support still didn’t surpass the number of voters opposed to her. Initially, both candidates faced majority rejection, but Harris lowered that to under 50%, while Trump’s opposition rose to 52%. By Election Day, Trump was the only candidate with a majority of Arizonans ruling him out. Lastly, few voters were undecided, and more shifted away from the middle in Trump’s support than Harris’s after Biden’s withdrawal. Normally this would signal a high likelihood of Harris winning, which ultimately ended up not being the case. 

Looking solely at strong supporters in a measure we call the Commitment Index, both candidates saw an upward trajectory in their strong supporter base (Figure 5). The Harris campaign saw strong traction at the beginning of her run but seemed to hit a lull towards the middle of September. Afterward, support for Harris continued to increase, but at a slower pace until mid-October. Strong support for Trump had a straighter path; it increased in steady intervals. On Election Day, both candidates had the same percentage of strong support among voters.

On the opposite side of the spectrum, looking at voters who are motivated by voting against a candidate (what we call the Rejection Index) tells a different story. When Harris became the nominee in July, her Rejection Index was 62%, but it dropped to 49% by August (Figure 6). It fluctuated, rising again in September before returning to 49% on Election Day. Meanwhile, Trump’s Rejection Index spiked in July after Harris entered, then fell as hers rose, only to climb again. He ended with a Rejection Index of 52%.

Combining these two measurements by subtracting the Rejection Index from the Commitment Index gives us insight into how voters were motivated during this election (for Candidate A versus against Candidate B). Ideally, a candidate would want to see numbers in the positive range, showing commitment amongst voters to be greater than rejection. However, the values in Figure 7 are all in the negative range, showing that voters were motivated to vote out of opposition to the other candidate in this election.

Taking it a step further, we can look at the specific issues that motivated voters in Arizona to vote in this election (Figure 8). When asked how strongly each issue motivated their vote, Harris voters prioritized protecting democracy (63%), followed by abortion (60%) and healthcare (58%). Trump voters, on the other hand, focused on inflation/economy (83%), with immigration (75%) and crime (52%) as their next top issues. There was no overlap between the two groups' top motivations. Harris voters ranked Trump voters' key issues—economy, immigration, and crime—among the least motivating, though none received less than 20%. Trump voters allocated only 2% to civil and LGBTQ+ issues and 10% to racism and discrimination.

Looking closer at the top three issues for Harris voters, protecting democracy was the only issue to have a majority of strongly supportive voters (Figure 9). Almost one-quarter of Harris voters were unmotivated by both healthcare and protecting democracy. While one in ten (11%) of Harris voters were unmotivated by abortion, 48% of Harris voters were not confident in their stance on this issue.

Looking at the top three issues for Trump supporters, the majority of Trump supporters were highly motivated by issues of inflation/the economy and immigration (Figure 10). Conversely, only one-quarter of Trump supporters were highly motivated by crime - more than half of Trump supporters (57%) were uncommitted to the issue.

Trump supporters were more united in their motivations for voting in this election. Harris voters, on the other hand, had more mixed opinions and were more likely to point to a variety of issues that motivated them; only one issue breached the majority in the highly motivated category. Among their top issues, Trump supporters were only really divided on the issue of crime, with more allocating under 40% motivation than those giving it above 80%.

Michigan

From mid-March until late June, support for Biden among Michigan voters was high and generally rising (Figure 11). The first debate in June had disastrous effects, however, resulting in a nosedive in his numbers while support for Trump rose. In late July, after becoming the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, support for Harris followed a similar trend in the Great Lakes State as it did in Arizona. From mid-August until early October, she breached support for Trump and seemed to create a sizable gap. However, by mid-October, Trump’s support steadily increased to close the gap between the two candidates.

Looking at support levels for the 2024 candidates based on how voters cast their ballots back in 2020 shows the same pattern (Figure 12).

Turning to the distribution of support amongst Michigan panelists, 44% of panelists allocated 80% or higher to their likelihood of supporting Harris’ candidacy, while half (49%) said there was less than a 20% chance they would support her (Figure 13). This marks a significant shift from Biden’s numbers: when Harris became the Democratic nominee, strong support for her rose by 6%, while the percentage of those unlikely to support her dropped by 5%.

Trump’s 2024 numbers weren’t completely different from Harris’ - 42% of voters strongly supported his candidacy, while 50% were highly unlikely to support him (Figure 14). In comparison to his support levels running against Biden, his cohort of strong supporters increased by 5%, and those unlikely to support him decreased by 2%.

These results reveal key insights into Michigan voters’ opinions. Like in Arizona, Harris was seen as an improvement over Biden, with strong support rising and opposition decreasing when she entered the race. Similarly, Trump saw increased strong support and a decrease in opposition. Both candidates had more voters unlikely to support them than strongly supporting them, showing a race driven by dislike. While Harris managed to reduce opposition to just under 50% in the final months, Trump did not. Lastly, more voters in Michigan were less certain of their vote (compared to AZ), with a larger share of Trump’s support falling in the 60-79% commitment range.

Looking at the Commitment Index for our Michigan panel, Harris’ campaign saw a steep upward trajectory from mid-August until mid-September (Figure 15). There was a small dip in strong support in October, but by Election Day, her commitment index had risen back to its previous level. Strong support for Trump was initially decreasing; however, it increased in mid-September, then dropped by a few points until mid-October.

Observing the Rejection Index for each candidate, rejection for Harris decreased from 61% to 48% after becoming the presumptive Democratic nominee (Figure 16). After that, it did not change much, hovering around 48-49%. Trump’s Rejection Index rose when Harris entered the race, before it steadily declined and ultimately stagnated in the final month leading up to the election.

Looking at the difference in commitment and rejection, both candidates were stuck in the negative range (Figure 17). Since entering the race, Harris was higher than Trump, but Trump was the only candidate to see upward mobility in this measurement once Harris was officially nominated as the Democratic candidate in August, going from a difference of 10 points in August to just 3 points prior to the election.

In Michigan, like in Arizona, Harris and Trump supporters were driven by different issues. Trump voters prioritized inflation/economy, immigration, and crime, while issues like racism, abortion, and civil rights had a minimal impact, with each receiving less than 20%. This suggests that Michigan Trump voters may have been more motivated to vote against these issues. 

Trump voters in both Arizona and Michigan shared the same top and bottom three motivating issues. For Harris supporters in Michigan, protecting democracy, racism, and healthcare were the top priorities, with protecting democracy receiving 80%, far higher than any other issue (Figure 18). The lowest issues for Harris voters were inflation/economy, immigration, and crime, with crime receiving less than 20%. Harris voters in Michigan focused more on protecting democracy, allocating 17% more than those in Arizona, while Arizona voters were more focused on abortion, giving it 20% more than in Michigan. The issues least important to Harris voters in Michigan were the same as those most important to Trump voters, highlighting the stark party divide.

Looking at the distribution of opinion of the top three issues for Trump voters in Michigan, there was a wider range of views compared to Trump voters in Arizona (Figure 19). The only issue that highly impacted the majority of Trump voters when voting was issues of inflation/economy. However, over one-quarter of Trump voters are uncommitted regarding the issue of inflation/economy. While crime was a top issue for Michigan Trump supporters, over one-quarter allocated it less than a 20% chance of impacting their vote, and less than 40% were strongly motivated by it.

Harris voters in Michigan are strongly unified by the issue of protecting democracy (Figure 20). On the issues of racism and discrimination and healthcare, only roughly one-quarter of Michigan Harris supporters are highly motivated by these issues. Around 40% of Harris voters allocated issues of racism and discrimination and healthcare less than 20%.

Looking at both candidates, voters in Michigan had a much wider range of opinions than voters in Arizona. Trump supporters were more unified on issues, while Harris supporters were more divided. Harris voters in Michigan had the highest percentage of those being strongly motivated by protecting democracy. Trump supporters, though less highly motivated, had lower percentages in the "highly unmotivated" category and a higher percentage of voters were uncertain about each issue, allocating between 20-80%.

Nevada

Our Nevada panel showed support for Biden far exceeding Trump from mid-March until mid-May, when support for both candidates suddenly flipped. Out of the three states being analyzed, Nevada was the only state where the first presidential debate had a minimal impact on support levels (Figure 21). Support for Harris jettisons similar to how it did in both Arizona and Michigan in late July. Support for Harris surged in late July, similar to trends in Arizona and Michigan. However, in August, her momentum slowed as her campaign gained support, but at a much slower pace.

The distribution of support for Harris in Nevada reveals that her support in the Silver State was low, with only 3 out of 10 voters (30%) allocating 80% or more to supporting her candidacy (Figure 22). This percentage is low compared to Arizona and Michigan. However, roughly the same percentage of voters allocated less than 20% to supporting her candidacy in Michigan as they did in Nevada (49%). As was the case in AZ and MI, Harris taking over as the Democratic nominee resulted in a positive shift in opinions. 

Unlike in Arizona and Michigan, the shift in support for Trump after Harris entered the race was negative in Nevada (Figure 23). Both the percentage of voters who disapproved of Trump increased, and the percentage of voters who strongly supported him decreased. 

Despite the negative shift in voters' views of Trump, his support in Nevada still exceeded Harris'. Additionally, a larger percentage of Nevada voters remained undecided between the two candidates. This number decreased slightly for Trump after Harris entered the race, but it increased for Harris after Biden dropped out (Figure 24). Both candidates also saw a significantly lower percentage of highly supportive voters in Nevada when compared to Arizona and Michigan. For Nevada voters, this was an election highly motivated by opposition for the other candidate with a large group of undecided voters. 

The Commitment Indexes for Harris and Trump showed Trump having a slight advantage heading into Election Day. Out of all three states, Nevada had the closest Commitment Index between the two candidates.

Looking at the Rejection Index, Harris had a slight advantage over Trump (49% vs. 51%) (Figure 25).

Once again, the difference in the candidates’ Commitment and Rejection Indexes were in the negative territory, showing this election was motivated more by opposition than support (Figure 26).

In Nevada, Trump and Harris voters were once again divided in their top three issues motivating them to turn out to the polls (Figure 27). The top three issues for Trump voters remain the same (inflation/economy, immigration, and crime). Harris voters in Nevada share the same top three issues with Harris voters in Arizona (protecting democracy, abortion, and healthcare), although no average allocation reaches 50%.

The majority of Trump voters (53%) were highly motivated by inflation and the economy, and 45% were highly motivated by issues of immigration, but crime was again a divisive issue in terms of motivating voters (Figure 28). 2 out of 5 (41%) allocated less than 20% to the issue, while just 1 out of 5 (20%) allocated more than 80%. 

There was a wider range of opinions when it came to the top three issues motivating Nevada Harris voters (Figure 29). There was roughly an even spread of opinion, with no more than one-quarter of these voters (16-25%) allocating 80 or more points to any one issue area.

In Conclusion

It was clear that the 2024 general election cycle was not about the popularity of either candidate but was instead more about opposition to the other candidate or the other “side” in general. Therefore, it was important for each candidate to unite their voter base on the issues that motivated them the most.

Trump’s win in these three swing states may, in part, be due to his ability to unite voters by talking about the issues that motivated them the most: inflation, the economy, and immigration. Harris voters, on the other hand, were less homogenous in their viewpoints and priorities, which could explain why her campaign failed to garner enough support to claim victory in key swing states beyond these three examples.

The Trump campaign made sweeping promises to alleviate the stress of millions of Americans who feel impacted by issues like inflation and the economy and were motivated to vote for him because of it; only time will tell if Trump’s second term will accomplish this. However, this election has shown us that it is not always important which candidate voters like more – it’s also about their ability to unite them on a handful of motivating issues.